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Abstract 
Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the 
metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the 
embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth 
examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one 
actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas 
Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human nature. I conclude that a cryopreserved human 
embryo counts, both metaphysically and morally, as a person; and thus the utilization of such 
embryos for inherently destructive research purposes is impermissible. 
Introduction 
Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church, argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This 
position, moreover, does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s 
reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. Germain Grisez represents this view: 
The frozen embryo truly is a tiny baby. Even though this baby should not 
have been brought into being as he or she was,1 now that this new person 
exists, he or she—like a baby conceived as a result of fornication, 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Brandon Brown, Patrick Lee, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a draft of 
this paper. A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Maritain Association at 
Walsh University, North Canton, Ohio, October 14–16, 2010. 
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adultery, rape, or incest—has the same immeasurable worth and deserves 
the same respect and loving care as every other human being.2 
The question is worth exploring, however, of whether the metaphysical and moral status 
of a “frozen” embryo is indeed the same as one living in utero. One phrase used to describe the 
status of a cryopreserved embryo is “suspended animation.” The use of this phrase has 
metaphysical import insofar as “animation” is derived from the Latin word for “soul”—anima—
as used by Thomas Aquinas and other Christian medieval philosophers. Does cryopreservation 
thus involve “suspending” the soul? What would this entail with respect to a frozen embryo’s 
nature a human “person”? I will explore these questions from the perspective of Aquinas’s 
metaphysical account of human nature. I will briefly elucidate what Aquinas’s account entails 
concerning when a typical human embryo is first “ensouled”—and thereby becomes a person—
and whether a cryopreserved embryo is similarly ensouled. The determination of whether a 
cryopreserved human embryo is in the metaphysical category of “person” is foundational to the 
question of its moral status. 
Thomistic Account of Human Nature and Embryogenesis 
According to Aquinas, all human beings are persons.3 He adopts the definition of 
personhood developed by Boethius: “An individual substance of a rational nature.”4 The 
disposition of a human body is determined by its having a rational soul as its “substantial 
form.”5 As a substantial form, a rational soul is responsible for the existence of a human being, 
the actualization of the matter that composes a human being, and the unity of existence and 
activity in a human being.6 
One way to understand the notion of a rational soul as a substantial form, in 
contemporary terms, is to think of it as a “principle of organization” for a human body. A human 
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body is an “organic” construct. It has a variety of parts that both operate independently and 
function collectively to support the existence and activity of a living, sensing, and thinking 
being—a rational soul thus has vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities. Both the 
independent operation of one of a body’s organs, and its functional unity with the body’s other 
organs, are governed by the formal, or functional, unity of the organism itself. 
A human being is not identical to either her rational soul or the matter it informs. Rather, 
a human being is composed of her informed material body. Aquinas concludes, “A human being 
is said to be from soul and body just as from two things a third is constituted that is neither of the 
two, hence a human being is neither soul nor body.”7 
This general metaphysical account of human nature raises the specific question of when a 
human being first comes into existence.8 Aquinas’s explicit account of human embryogenesis 
has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval 
biological information, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of 
scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas’s basic metaphysical account of human 
nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human 
being’s beginning.9 
Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human being until its body is informed by 
a rational soul. Aquinas holds that a soul’s capacities to perform its definitive operations—
whether life, sensation, or rational thought—is necessary for it to exist.10 The actualization of 
such capacities, however, is accidental—i.e., not essential—to the soul’s existence.11 
Of course, a developing human embryo or fetus, and even a newborn infant, does not 
actually perform all the operations proper to a human being, including rational thought. 
Nonetheless, Aquinas denies that this lack implies that a rational soul does not inform a 
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developing human embryo, fetus, or newborn infant. All that is required for a rational soul to be 
present, and thus for a human being to exist, is a human body with the capacities for a rational 
soul’s proper operations.12 The basic metaphysical principle Aquinas employs in his account of 
embryogenesis is that a rational soul does not inform a physical body unless the body is properly 
disposed for that type of soul.13 
Applying this Thomistic metaphysical principle, Benedict Ashley argues that a human 
zygote—the fertilized ovum that is the immediate product of conception—is a human being with 
all the proper capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought. As evidence of this, Ashley cites 
the fact that a human zygote contains the epigenetic primordia of the biological structures proper 
to a human being; for example, from the zygote will eventually be formed the “primitive streak,” 
from which the brain and nervous system will develop.14 Ashley further points to a zygote’s 
DNA-filled nucleus as the “control center” that regulates embryonic biological functioning, such 
that a zygote is a unified, individual substance from fertilization onward.15 This supports the 
conclusion that a one-celled human zygote, and a fortiori the embryo and fetus into which it 
develops, is informed by a rational soul and is thereby a human person.16 
Metaphysical Implications of Cryopreservation 
The extreme conditions—both internal and external—that characterize a cryopreserved 
embryo can cast doubt that such an embryo, unlike a normally developing human embryo in 
utero, is rationally ensouled and thereby a person. Nicholas Tonti-Filippini summarizes the 
unique condition of cryopreserved embryo: 
My argument goes to the nature of chemically anhydrating embryos, 
replacing water with a cryoprotectant such as glycol, and super freezing at 
temperatures at which no life has been known to survive. This is a state in 
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which the parts of the embryo are no longer in an integrated relationship: 
all biological activity is interrupted, and the parts are separated by the 
chemical solution…. Frozen and anhydrous storage is a state of suspended 
animation, of life, as it were, arrested.17 
 
But in a frozen-anhydrous state all activity ceases. The parts of the embryo 
are separated by the chemical solution and, in that state, the parts of the 
whole do not relate to one another in any physiological sense except 
perhaps by being related spatially. The separating effect of the chemical 
solution and the effect of super-freezing means that the embryo is not 
integrated or dynamic in the way in which we normally consider to be 
essential to being a living organism.18 
As described, Aquinas defines a human person as a rationally ensouled human body—the 
rational soul being responsible, as the form of the body, for the body’s existence and nature as a 
living, sentient animal capable of rational thought. I further contend that, from the Thomistic 
metaphysical viewpoint, it is most reasonable to conclude that a human embryo is informed by a 
rational soul from conception onward—that is, once its integrated, organic life functions 
commence and development toward eventual human adulthood ensues. But, in the case of a 
cryopreserved embryo, its integrated, organic life functions cease once the cryoprotectant 
separates the embryo’s parts, which were previously integrated and able to function collectively 
through the medium of water. 
Nevertheless, a cryopreserved embryo is “alive in the sense that it could be thawed so 
that life development could continue”19: 
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[A cyropreserved embryo] can be re-integrated through the removal of the 
cryopreservative, rehydration, and thawing. Dynamism can be restored by that 
process. He or she is therefore not dead; there is a possible future. Death, by 
contrast, is a permanent state. These embryos can be restored to an integrated 
state and to activity and development.20 
Tonti-Filippini refers to such an embryo as having a “quasi-living existence.”21 In accordance 
with the “benefit of the doubt” that Tonti-Filippini recommends giving to cryopreserved 
embryos, and based on the Thomistic account of embryogenesis described, I conclude that there 
is every reason to assert that a cryopreserved embryo is indeed, substantially speaking, a living 
organism informed by a rational soul—a human person: 
A frozen embryo is not dead—it is still alive. Its metabolic rate only suffices to 
preserve its potential for sustaining life, not for development or growth. This 
represents a case of self-preservation or suspended animation while life is 
dormant. The live embryo that survives thawing is the same ontological embryo 
that underwent the freezing process. The frozen embryo is re-activated once it is 
thawed.22 
Although the definitive activities that characterize a living human organism are not present while 
an embryo is cryopreserved, the intrinsic potential for the embryo to exhibit such activities is 
present nonetheless. 
One may question at this point what type of potentiality characterizes a cryopreserved 
embryo’s life functions. Stephen Hanson argues that the potentiality of a cryopreserved embryo 
is categorically different from that of an in vivo embryo: 
7 
 
A frozen embryo will not become an adult human being without significant 
external interference. It is not actively developing towards any future state…. In 
its frozen state, the embryo will not grow, develop, or change at all over time. It is 
not dynamic. Its lack of active potential is not merely a matter of its chances of 
being selected and successfully implanted; its developmental process has been 
“switched off” by the freezing process, and cannot recommence without a 
significant change in the embryo’s status.23 
Aquinas distinguishes between two types of potentiality: active and passive. If a 
substance, such as a typical human embryo, has per se an active potentiality for the definitive 
activities of a human person—life, sentience, and rationality—then it is informed by a rational 
soul. In contrast to an active potentiality, something has a passive potentiality if it can be the 
subject of externally directed change such that it can become what it is not already. Hence, if a 
substance, such as a sperm or ovum, has only a passive potentiality to become a substance that 
has an active potentiality for such activities, then it is not yet informed by a rational soul—it is 
not yet a human person.24 
Furthermore, active potentiality comes in two varieties. The first is what Robert Pasnau 
refers to as a “capacity in hand” to perform an operation, which means that no further 
development or significant change is required for the potentiality to be actualized.25 For example, 
a person may have a capacity in hand to speak Spanish if, for example, she had majored in it in 
college; but it may be the case at any one moment that she is not using this capacity, and so it is 
not in actual operation, which it would be if she were actually speaking Spanish at that moment. 
The second is what Norman Kretzmann refers to as a substance’s “natural potentiality” to 
develop a capacity in hand to perform an operation.26 For example, before having learned 
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Spanish and thus developed a capacity to do so, a person would have a natural potentiality to 
develop this capacity, as opposed to a dog or a plant that lacks such a natural potentiality. Any 
human person is born with an innate cognitive architecture that allows her to acquire a language, 
Spanish or otherwise27; other sentient animals apparently lack such cognitive architecture. Of 
course, actualizing a human person’s natural potentiality for language acquisition requires 
external input—textbooks, teachers, exposure to native speakers, etc.—but the natural 
potentiality itself must be active if such input is to be effective; and while the actualization of 
this potentiality may alter a person from being a non-Spanish-speaker to being a Spanish-
speaker, it does not alter her essential nature as a human person with a natural potentiality to 
acquire languages such as Spanish. Any natural substance has numerous natural potentialities as 
defined by its essence, some of which may be developed into capacities in hand while others are 
left undeveloped.28 
Because a substance possesses its essential set of active potentialities by virtue of its 
substantial form, which is also what grounds a substance’s persistent numerical identity,29 it 
follows that 1) something that has an active potentiality for the definitive activities of human 
persons already possesses the essential nature definitive of personhood, and 2) something that 
lacks such a potentiality, even though it may have the passive potentiality to obtain it, does not 
yet possess the nature of personhood and thus must undergo a change in both specific and 
numerical identity if it is to become a person.30 
Active potentiality refers to something’s capacity to be in a certain way, as opposed to 
merely the possibility of its becoming something.31 For example, a sperm or ovum would possess 
the relevant active potentialities definitive of personhood only if it could come to actualize those 
potentialities while preserving its numerical identity—i.e., it remains the same substance 
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identical with itself throughout its development from a germ cell to an actually self-conscious 
and rational person. A change, however, from a germ cell to a person does not appear to be an 
identity-preserving transformation: a sperm loses its substantial identity when it fuses with an 
ovum, and vice versa, to form a new substance—an embryo.32 The only sense in which a germ 
cell may plausibly be called a “potential person” is in the weak sense that it provides the makings 
of a person.33 
Given this distinction, it may seem that we ought to conclude that a cryopreserved 
embryo has only a passive potentiality to engage in definitive human activities. The primary 
reason a sperm or ovum has only a passive potentiality in this regard is due to the fact that each 
requires something external to itself to change it such that its very nature is altered as it takes on 
new capacities for different types of activities—an ovum which does not have per se a capacity 
for sentience or rationality gains such capacities once its haploid genome is complemented by the 
haploid genome provided by the sperm that fertilizes it. By the same token, a cryopreserved 
embryo requires something external to itself, an IVF technician, to change it—by removing the 
cryopreservative, rehydrating it, and thawing it—such that it can develop into a fully actualized 
human person. The difference, however, between an ovum’s dependence on a sperm cell and an 
cryopreserved embryo’s dependence on an IVF technician is that an ovum’s nature is altered in 
the process of fertilization from being a merely living cell to a dynamically integrated, living 
organism capable of developing faculties of sentience and rationality. A cryopreserved embryo, 
on the other hand, does not suffer a change in its nature, but rather a restoration of the capacities 
for growth and development it had prior to being anhydrated and frozen. Its nature as a human 




Admittedly, the claim that a cryopreserved embryo’s nature is “restored” when it is 
thawed, rather than it being “altered” by the freezing process and then changed back, appears 
question-begging prima facie. However, there are at least two reasons supporting this 
conclusion. First, the fact that the cryopreservation process does not permanently destroy an 
embryo’s capacity to develop into a fully actualized human person is evidence that something 
essentially “human” remains in the cryopreserved embryo such that it is not able to become a 
different type of being once it is thawed—it will either become a fully actualized human person 
or it will die. Although the water that is artificially removed is certainly essential to the 
embryo’s—and later the adult’s—organic functioning, the mere fact of cryopreservation with 
successful reversal evidences that such water is not essential to the embryo’s substantial 
existence. Although the water is intrinsic to the embryo, is part of its nature, and is necessary for 
it to function as a living organism, the water is not essential for the embryo’s very existence 
given an effective artificial substitute. 
Of course, sperm and ova share a similar fate of either becoming a fully actualized human 
person—if conception occurs—or dying after ejaculation or menstruation. As argued previously, 
however, we have good reason to regard a human embryo, prior to cryopreservation, as having 
an intrinsic active potentiality—as opposed to the passive potentiality possessed by sperm and 
ova—to develop into a more fully actualized human person. While it is arguable that 
cryopreservation reverts the embryo’s active potentiality into a passive form, such an occurrence 
would involve a substantial change in which a nascent human person dies, her organic parts are 
preserved, and—if thawed—is restored to what would be a numerically distinct existence. This 
leads us to the second argument. 
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We can differentiate the relevant potentialities of the different types of entities under 
discussion thus: 1) A sperm cell or ovum has merely a passive potentiality to develop into a 
person because a) each must be changed by an external agent—the other gamete—in order for 
such development to occur, and b) such change is not identity-preserving—each gamete ceases 
to exist in the process of fertilization; 2) an intact embryo, existing either in vitro or in utero, has 
an active potentiality to develop itself—within a supportive environment34—into a more fully 
actualized self-conscious and rational person; 3) a cryopreserved embryo, while not actively 
developing itself, nevertheless retains the natural potentiality—a form of active potentiality 
sufficient for rational ensoulment—to develop itself if successfully thawed and implanted. A 
cryopreserved embryo thus has a mixed potentiality: It must passively receive external 
assistance, but such assistance is only effective due to the embryo’s intrinsic natural 
potentiality—analogous to a human infant’s natural potentiality to passively receive external data 
that helps her to learn language. 
Second, the age-old principle of Ockham’s razor applies equally well in metaphysics as it 
does in empirical science. In this case, on the Thomistic understanding of human nature, an 
extraordinarily more ontologically complex alternative awaits the denial of the claim in question. 
This alternative would involve the claim that a human embryo dies through the cryopreservation 
process—presumably once the essential water medium is removed—and then is “reanimated” 
when the embryo is rehydrated and thawed. Given the Thomistic conclusion that a human 
embryo is rationally ensouled from conception onward, regardless of whether conception 
occurred naturally in utero or artificially in vitro, one must conclude on this picture that the 
embryo’s rational soul separates from its body after the water is removed and the soul persists in 
a disembodied state while the embryo is cryopreserved.35 Once the embryo is successfully 
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thawed, one of two events would occur: either the same rational soul re-informs the now living 
embryonic body, or a new soul informs the embryo since it is arguably a different substance than 
it was prior to being frozen. Neither of these options is attractive given the more ontologically 
simple picture above, which involves an embryo’s rational soul continuing to inform it—albeit in 
a quiescent state—until the embryo returns to a condition in which the soul’s capacities for life 
and, after a period of further development, sensation and rational thought may be actualized once 
again. 
It may be objected that such discontinuous existence is not metaphysically problematic at 
all, and I agree that there is nothing inherently problematic about an embryo ceasing to exist, her 
parts being preserved, and then those parts coming to compose a numerically distinct embryo. It 
is, nonetheless, an inelegant picture that should not be preferred—absent prior ontological 
presuppositions—to a competing explanation that satisfactorily accounts for an embryo’s 
persistent numerical identity throughout this procedure. And while it is true that the embryo’s life 
functions have (temporarily) ceased, it does not necessarily follow that the embryo itself has 
ceased to exist, so long as we have reason to believe that the embryo’s intrinsic active 
potentiality to engage in such functions again and develop into a more fully actualized person 
remains, as I have argued. Thus, as Steven Luper contends, 
Instead of saying that, in the case of … frozen embryos, an organism’s life has 
been suspended or temporarily ended, let us instead say that its vital processes 
have been temporarily suspended, and that it remains alive when these stop. This 
is appropriate, because an organism whose vital processes are suspended for a 
time still has, during that time, the capacity36 to maintain itself, just as a sleeping 
person retains the capacity for consciousness…. These reflections suggest that 
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something dies not when its vital processes are suspended, but rather when its 
capacity to maintain itself through its vital processes (which remain even while in 
suspended animation) is destroyed.37 
Conclusion–Moral Status of Cryopreserved Embryos 
A human embryo’s moral status, from the Thomistic perspective, whether it is 
developing in utero or is frozen, follows from its metaphysical status as a person. A human 
person has a fundamentally intrinsic value due to being a living, sentient, and rational substance. 
Rationality, on Aquinas’s view, is the highest capacity found among natural substances because 
it enables a person to come to know universal conceptual truths and to determine their own 
actions.38 Hence, he says, the term “person” is attributed to rational beings insofar as they have a 
special dignity—i.e., a particularly high degree of intrinsic value among natural substances.39 
Life, Aquinas further contends, is a fundamental good for a human person.40 Without life, none 
of a human person’s other inherently valuable capacities—including rationality—can be 
actualized in the service of contributing to the overall goodness of the natural world in which 
human persons exist and flourish. To act against the existence and flourishing of a human person 
thus constitutes a morally impermissible act that must be avoided due to the ethical mandate not 
to destroy, injure, or impede life as a fundamental good.41 This conclusion, of course, bears on 
the moral permissibility of human embryonic stem cell research. So long as such research 
involves harm or destruction of human embryos, regardless of whether they are conceived in 
vitro and cryopreserved, it violates such embryos’ fundamental moral status as persons.42 
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